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THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT
AND ACTIVE LABOR ACT OF 1986:
PROVIDING PROTECTION FROM
DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESS TO
EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE
The practice of patient dumping' is a by-product of the rising number
of uninsured persons in the United States coupled with an increased focus
by the health care industry on containing rising costs.2 In 1977, there
1. "The term 'patient dumping' is used to refer to the practice of those hospitals
which, despite being capable of providing the needed medical care, send patients to other
facilities or turn patients away because those patients are unable to pay." Reid v. Indian-
apolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 853, 853-54 (S.D. Ind. 1989). One
commentator defines patient dumping as:
[T]he world of medical nonpractice, where economic reality shatter childhood
images of kind, caring health care providers dedicated to saving lives. Patient
dumping is the refusal of hospitals, usually private hospitals, to treat patients in
need of emergency care (many of them women in labor) because of their inability
to pay.
Andrew J. McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against Patient
Dumping, 24 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 173, 174 (1989). Patient dumping also has been iden-
tified in situations involving discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or appearance.
See, e.g., Equal Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. Government Op-
erations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1988) [hereinafter Equal Access Hearings] (opening
statement of Hon. Ted Weiss, chairman of the subcommittee). Dumping of persons with
undesirable conditions, particularly those suspected of having Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS), appears to be on the rise. Id.; see also Debra Spencer, Is Racism
Killing Us?, ESSENCE, Jan. 1993, at 32 (discussing discriminatory treatment of African-
Americans in accessing medical treatment). Two common ways that patient dumping oc-
curs are the requirement of advance payment prior to treatment and the policy of refusing
treatment of persons without a personal physician on staff.
2. See generally Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the
COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1192-96 (1986) (describing the underlying rea-
sons for patient dumping). In 1984, over 35 million people under age 65 were without
health insurance; between 1981 and 1985 over one million people were cut from Medicaid.
Id. at 1193-94. By 1993, the number of uninsured in the United States had risen to 37
million. Rich Thomas, "A Walk in Space," NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1993, at 46. Hospitals are
now players in a competitive age where cost containment is caused by many factors. For
example, Medicare's shift to diagnostic related groups (DRGs) in 1983 in place of cost-
based reimbursements made hospitals more cost conscious and less willing to subsidize
charity care. Treiger, supra, at 1194. In addition, the insurance industry increasingly holds
hospitals accountable for the high costs of health care, and hospitals now compete for
insured patients. Id. at 1195. These are the primary factors that contributed to the cost
containment era in health care. Id. at 1193-96.
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were twenty-five million uninsured persons in the United States; that
number had risen to thirty-five million by 1988,3 and had reached thirty-
seven million by 1993.4 Increasing numbers of uninsured patients force
hospitals to make difficult choices between treating those in need and
keeping operating costs down.5 In many cases, these choices result in
denial of emergency treatment for the uninsured.6 Incidents of patient
dumping range from outright denials of emergency care to transfers of
unstable emergency patients for purely economic reasons.7
Common law as well as state and early federal statutory attempts to
address the problem of patient dumping had only a limited effect,'
prompting Congress to enact the Emergency Medical Treatment and Ac-
tive Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA or the Act) as part of the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). 9 Responding to
3. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 1, at 2.
4. Thomas, supra note 2, at 46.
5. Treiger, supra note 2, at 1193-96. TWo primary factors leading to patient dumping
include "an increase in the number of uninsured people in the United States," id. at 1193,
and "widespread cost containment efforts by the federal government." Id. at 1194. In
addition, private health care facilities are likewise looking to contain costs, thus "[i]n the
new era of competition with a price-driven marketplace, cost-shifting to subsidize charity
care is impractical and bad business." Id. at 1195; see also McClurg, supra note 1, at 179-82
(discussing the reasons for patient dumping).
6. Group Charges Patient "Dumping" Widespread, UPI, May 19, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File ("'The problem of "patient dumping" will not go away so
long at 37 million people remain uninsured and health care decisions are largely driven by
concerns about who pays the bill."' (quoting Dr. Sidney Wolfe, director of the Public Citi-
zen Health Research Group)). "A permanent solution to the problem of patient dumping
will occur only, as others have said, when the larger issue of health care financing, both for
the individuals and the hospitals is addressed." Equal Access Hearings, supra note 1, at
154 (testimony of Dr. Ansell). While healthcare reform would be the best solution to the
patient dumping dilemma, id., full implementation of healthcare legislation is still years
away. Thomas, supra note 2, at 49.
7. See Equal Access Hearings, supra note 1, at 14-20. Testimony was presented at
this hearing about a diabetic, unable to breath, who was refused treatment and physically
removed from a hospital in Tennessee because he owed the hospital money and had no
insurance. Id. at 14-16. He died the following day. Id. Further testimony concerned a
young woman six-and-one-half months pregnant who sought emergency treatment at a
hospital in Virginia. Id. at 43. She was bleeding and in severe pain. Id. After waiting
several hours, the woman was instructed to go to another hospital because she did not have
a private physician on staff. Id. The baby was born prematurly that afternoon and died
within minutes. Id.
8. See HEALTHCARE FACILrmES LAW § 6.2.2, at 428 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991)
(explaining that few state statutes addressing the problem of patient dumping provide for
adequate enforcement provisions); id. § 4.10.3, at 325-26 (describing why the Hill-Burton
Act, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.),
the federal statute that attempted, among other things, to curb patient dumping, was
ineffective).
9. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988
& Supp. III 1991)).
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highly publicized incidents of patient dumping, Congress enacted EM-
TALA to prevent the denial of emergency care to uninsured and indigent
patients.10
EMTALA incorporates two levels of treatment with which a hospital
must comply to avoid violating the Act." First, a hospital must provide
any individual who presents a potential emergency with a medical screen-
ing exam to determine if an emergency condition in fact exists.' 2 Second,
a hospital is responsible for stabilizing any emergency patient prior to
discharge or transfer to another hospital.' 3 In addition, any physician
who negligently violates requirements of the Act is liable under EM-
TALA."4 Civil fines are imposed on hospitals and physicians for failing
to comply with the statute's provisions.' 5 Any person directly harmed as
a result of a violation of the Act may bring a civil suit against the violating
hospital and obtain relief under the laws of the state where the violation
occurred.'
6
10. See H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 27, 42 (1986) (indicating that
"[t]he Committee is greatly concerned about the increasing number of reports that hospital
emergency rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the
patient does not have medical insurance"), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605; id.,
pt.3, at 5 (stating that "[i]n recent years there has been a growing concern about the provi-
sion of adequate emergency room medical services to individuals who seek care, particu-
larly to the indigent and uninsured"), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 726.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1992). The Act requires that emer-
gency patients be given an "appropriate medical screening examination within the capabil-
ity of the hospital's emergency department to determine whether or not an emergency
medical condition... exists." Id. § 1395dd(a). If the hospital determines that the individ-
ual does have an emergency condition, then "the hospital must provide either-(A)... for
such further medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
medical condition or to provide for treatment of the labor, or (B) for transfer of the indi-
vidual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section." Id.
§ 1395dd(b)(1).
12. Id. § 1395dd(b)(A).
13. Id. A patient may be transferred only if the benefits of a transfer outweigh the
risks to the patient. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii).
14. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). A physician's violation can result from his or her authori-
zation of a patient transfer where the benefits of the transfer do not outweigh the risks, or
through a misrepresentation of either a patient's condition or of a hospital's obligations
under the Act. Id. However, these illustrations are not the sole means of violating the
Act. EMTALA clearly states that any negligent violation of the Act can result in imposi-
tion of a fine on the physician. Id.
15. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A). "A participating hospital that negligently violates a re-
quirement of this section is subject to a civil money penalty of not more than $50,000 (or
not more than $25,000 in the case of a hospital with less than 100 beds) for each such
violation." Id. Physicians are likewise subject to civil monetary penalties of up to $50,000
for each violation. Id § 1395dd(d)(1)(B).
16. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). Section 1395dd(d)(2)(A) provides:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating
hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against
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A fundamental question regarding EMTALA is whether it applies
broadly, to any individual, or more narrowly, to indigent and uninsured
patients only. 17 The statute's plain language provides that the Act applies
to "any individual" without regard to the patient's ability to pay.' 8 How-
ever, EMTALA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
protect those individuals without insurance or other means of payment
from the denial of emergency medical care.' 9 While some courts have
followed the legislative history and required that indigency be pled to
establish an EMTALA violation,2" other courts, adhering to the express
language of the statute, have extended EMTALA's protection to any in-
dividual regardless of economic means.2'
the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable
relief as is appropriate.
Id. This section only provides for a civil suit against a violating hospital, not a physician.
Id.; see also Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 393 (10th Cir. 1993) (indicating that EMTALA
only provides for a cause of action against a violating hospital, not a physician). However,
the actions of a physician may result in liability for the hospital where a physician acts as an
agent for the facility. See Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d
676, 678 (10th Cir. 1991) (involving potential liability on the part of the hospital resulting
from conduct of the physicians acting as agents). Since the laws of the various states apply
to the extent that there is no conflict with any of EMTALA's provision, suits brought in
different states for similar violations could result in different relief for the parties depend-
ing on differences in the state statutes and whether they conflict with EMTALA. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(f).
17. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 269-70 (6th Cir.
1990) (discussing whether EMTALA applies only to indigent individuals or to any person
dumped by a health care facility); Lee v. Allegheny Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F. Supp.
900, 902 (W.D. Va. 1991) (finding that the plain words of the statute should have effect,
thus applying the Act to "any individual"); see also infra notes 113-40 and accompanying
text.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(b). Both of these provisions specifically reference "any
individual" and give no indication that the statute should be interpreted differently. See id.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605-06; id., pt. 3, at 5 (indicating a particular concern for those without
insurance or another means to pay), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 726.
20. See, e.g., Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that
the legislative history should be followed when applying the statute, thus limiting its appli-
cation to uninsured individuals); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495, 497
(S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that economics must be the motivation for patient dumping to
find a violation of the Act).
21. See, e.g., Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (indicating that EMTALA makes no distinction between the insured and the
uninsured; its language is clear when it states "any individual," therefore, the Act applies
to any person seeking emergency assistance); Burditt v. United States Dep't. of Health &
Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1371-72 (5th Cir. 1991) (dumping a patient because the risk
of liability constitutes a violation of the statute); Cleland, 917 F.2d at 270 (holding that
where the words of a statute are clear, and reading them as such does not lead to an absurd
result, the facial reading of the statute must prevail). Other courts have recognized this
controversy in dicta. See, e.g., Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1132
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Under this broad reading of EMTALA many suits brought under the
Act resemble negligence claims involving damages for medical malprac-
tice or wrongful death.22 One court examining the issue explicitly deter-
mined that the drafters of this antipatient dumping statute did not intend
to create a federal malpractice statute, but intended to create a new cause
of action for failure to treat.23 The facts giving rise to an EMTALA viola-
tion may nonetheless involve an allegation of negligence. 24 The two
causes of action, however, are distinct-EMTALA clearly provides an
action for failure to treat emergency patients, independent of any negli-
gent treatment.25
This Comment examines the rise of the patient dumping problem and
analyzes common law and early statutory attempts to address this prob-
lem. This Comment then explores the extension of EMTALA protection
beyond the indigent to include all persons, and discusses its application
beyond the confines of the emergency room. Next, this Comment ana-
lyzes several cases decided since the passage of EMTALA to determine
whether a violation of the statute was truly alleged or whether the dis-
putes were merely malpractice claims disguised as federal antidumping
violations. Next, this Comment explores but rejects the suggestion that
EMTALA should be limited to apply only to the indigent, as such a limi-
tation provides insufficient protection from discriminatory emergency
treatment to all' persons. Finally, this Comment discusses the emerging
characteristics that distinguish EMTALA violations from malpractice or
negligence claims, and proposes that EMTALA would be strengthened
by more accurate definitions of key terms and stricter reporting require-
(6th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (indicating that "[t]he Act requires hospitals to give emergency aid
to indigent patients"); Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853,
853-54 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (dictum) (indicating that EMTALA was enacted to address the
problem of patient dumping, which the court defines as the turning away of patients be-
cause they are unable to pay).
22. See, e.g., Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 304 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992) (alleging
an EMTALA violation after an unsuccessful suit in state court for malpractice); Abercrom-
bie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1991) (alleging both
a violation of EMTALA and a pendent state claim for wrongful death); Gatewood, 933
F.2d at 1039 (involving allegations of malpractice and violations of EMTALA for failure to
stabilize a patient prior to discharge).
23. See Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041. "The federal Emergency Act is not intended to
duplicate preexisting legal protections, but rather to create a new cause of action, generally
unavailable under state tort law, for what amounts to failure to treat." Id.
24. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
25. Violations of EMTALA include failure to stabilize prior to transfer or failure to
provide an appropriate medical screening. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
Although negligence could become an issue if the failure to stabilize was caused by negli-
gent actions on the part of hospital personnel, failure to treat should be the thrust behind
most EMTALA violations. See infra notes 163-69.
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ments for hospitals that receive transfers in violation of EMTALA. This
Comment concludes that EMTALA-a comprehensive antipatient
dumping statute providing significant protection for patients-would pro-
vide more effective protection for patients and provide guidance for hos-
pitals and physicians if a showing of discrimination by the hospital or
physician were required.
I. EARLY ATrEMPTS To CURB THE PROBLEM OF PATIENT DUMPING
The disparity between a public and a private hospital's duty to treat
patients established the historical backdrop for the patient dumping con-
troversy. At common law, private hospitals were under no obligation to
treat any particular individual and, consequently, were not required to
articulate any reason for refusing to provide treatment.26 Conversely,
public hospitals often were established under charters requiring them to
treat certain numbers or types of patients.27 Recognizing the harshness
of the common law rule allowing a private hospital to refuse to treat any
individual for any reason,28 courts established several exceptions to the
rule in order to alleviate its severe effects.29
26. See Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 157 So. 224,225 (Ala. 1934) (holding that
a private hospital is under no obligation to admit any patient and may deny admittance for
whatever reason it sees fit); Le Juene Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965) ("[A] private hospital is under no obligation to admit any patient that
it does not desire.... [Ilt is permissible for a private hospital to reject for whatever reason,
or no reason at all, any applicant for medical and hospital services."); see also 40 AM. JUR.
21 Hospitals and Asylums § 12, at 860 (1969) (noting that "a private hospital owes the
public no duty to accept any patient not desired by it").
27. HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW, supra note 8, § 4.10.2., at 322-23 (describing the
different duties imposed on public hospitals versus private hospitals).
28. See Le Juene, 171 So. 2d at 203 (discussing the harshness of the common-law rule);
see also Birmingham Baptist, 157 So. at 225. The Birmingham court articulated the com-
mon law rule:
Defendant is a private corporation, and not a public institution, and owes the
public no duty to accept any patient not desired by it. In this respect it is not
similar to a public utility. It is not necessary to assign any reason for its refusal to
accept a patient for hospital services.
Id.; see also Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 136 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961)
(discussing the traditional rule that a private hospital is under no outstanding obligation to
treat an individual).
29. See Mercy Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Winnebago County, 206 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Wis.
1973) (discussing dissatisfaction with the common law rule that led to the creation of
exceptions).
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A. Common Law Efforts to Impose a Duty to Treat on Health Care
Facilities
Courts have carved out several exceptions to the common law rule,
imposing a duty to treat upon public and private health care facilities
alike in specific situations. These exceptions find their roots in basic tort
law principles of reliance and abandonment.30
1. The "Reliance Exception"
One exception to the common law rule imposes a duty on private
health care facilities to provide emergency medical care where an individ-
ual seeking treatment relied on the facility to provide care.31 The ration-
ale for this exception is that, in an emergency situation, an individual
relies on the existence of an emergency ward; to deny that individual ac-
cess may further jeopardize the patient's emergency condition.32 In
Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove,33 an infant was denied emer-
gency treatment because she was already under the care of a physician,
and the hospital concluded that the medication she had been taking might
conflict with any medication administered by the hospital. 34 The child
died shortly after being denied emergency assistance.3' The Delaware
Supreme Court, recognizing the well-established common law rule, held
that in a situation where an emergency patient relied on the existence of
the medical facility and its custom of furnishing medical care, the facility
must render emergency care to avoid potential liability.36 Accordingly,
the court remanded the case to determine whether an actual emergency
existed.37
30. See, e.g., Manlove, 174 A.2d at 140 ("[Lliability on the part of a hospital may be
predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in case of an unmistakable emergency, if
the patient has relied upon a well-established custom of the hospital to render aid in such a
case."); Le Juene, 171 So. 2d at 203 (establishing a duty to treat based on a wrongful dis-
charge standard where once a patient is admitted, a hospital cannot discharge the patient
without potential liability); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Mo. 1969) (applying
the reliance principle of tort law that where an individual has relied on assistance, the
denial of that assistance can result in liability).
31. See Manlove, 174 A.2d at 139 (establishing the reliance exception to the common
law rule); see also Stanturf, 447 S.W.2d at 562 (adopting the Manlove exception and re-
manding the case to determine whether the requisite facts were established).




36. Id. at 140.
37. Id. at 140-41.
1994]
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The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted this reliance principal in Stan-
turf v. Sipes,38 where a physician contacted the only area hospital to have
his frostbitten patient admitted.39 The hospital refused to admit the pa-
tient without payment of a requisite $25.00 admission fee.' Although
the patient was unable to pay the fee, both his son-in-law and a local
organization volunteered to pay it for him.4 Nonetheless, the hospital
refused to admit the patient.42 The Missouri court, relying on Manlove,
determined that the hospital was potentially liable for the patient's inju-
ries because it departed from its established custom of accepting any pa-
tient who paid the admission fee.43 The court remanded the case to
determine if the facts met the requirements of the Manlove exception.
44
Thus, in order to reap the benefits of the reliance exception, an individ-
ual must establish two foundational prerequisites: (1) reliance upon the
existence of the medical facility when seeking emergency assistance; and
(2) the actual existence of a medical emergency.45 In Fabian v. Matzko,46
the failure to allege both an emergency condition and reliance on the
custom of the hospital to treat emergencies resulted in an application of
the common law rule and a denial of the exception.47
38. 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).




43. Id. at 561.
44. Id. at 562-63.
45. See Fabian v. Matzko, 344 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (holding that the
Manlove exception can not apply where reliance on the custom of providing emergency
assistance was not established and the patient did not actually go to the hospital to seek
treatment); see also Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140-41 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1961) (remanding the case to determine if an emergency actually existed).
46. Fabian, 344 A.2d at 569. Mrs. Fabian was diagnosed by her family physician, Dr.
Matzko, as having a viral infection after she suffered an attack of severe neck pain and
nausea. Id. at 570. When her condition worsened, her husband called the Geisinger Medi-
cal Center to consult with a physician, Dr. Cahill, who determined that Mrs. Fabian should
be admitted. Id. However, in accordance with hospital procedures, Dr. Cahill asked Mr.
Fabian if his wife had a family physician. Id. After discovering that Mrs. Fabian was in the
care of another doctor, Dr. Cahill indicated that Dr. Matzko, her physician would have to
make the arrangements for her admittance. Id. Mrs. Fabian was not admitted until several
days later because Dr. Matzko was unavailable. Id. By then her condition had worsened,
and she suffered a second attack before Dr. Matzko arranged for her admittance to the
hospital. Id. This second attack was actually a cerebral hemorrhage and left Mrs. Fabian
with "permanent brain damage, loss of speech, partial paralysis, loss of hearing, loss of
vision and expressive and receptive aphasia." Id.
47. Id. at 572. The court pointed out that the situation in Fabian was not analogous to
Manlove or Stanturf because the patient did not "rely on the policy of rendering emer-
gency care."' Id.; see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing Stanturf). In
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The success of the Manlove "reliance" exception was limited by the
necessary proofs.4' Once a party has established both the presence of an
emergency condition and reliance on the established custom of the hospi-
tal of providing emergency care, the duty to provide care is established.
Once the duty is established, however, the successful litigant also is re-
quired to prove all elements of the common law tort: breach of the duty,
proximate cause, and damages.4 9 Although the Manlove exception allevi-
ated the harsh effect of the common law no duty to treat rule, it failed to
function as a final solution due to the burdensome proofs involved.50
2. The Doctrine of Abandonment
Finding an alternative basis for imposing a duty to treat, the Supreme
Court of New York, Trial Term, held a hospital liable in Barcia v. Society
of New York Hospital."' In Barcia, the parents of a two year-old child
brought her to a New York hospital at the express instructions of their
family physician.52 The hospital performed tests on the child, but did not
admit her despite the admitting physician's observation that she "'looked
acutely ill to a mild degree."' 53 The following day, the parents returned
to the hospital because their daughter's condition had worsened.54 The
child died within twenty-four hours.55 The court held the hospital liable
because the physician was negligent in his failure to admit the patient on
the prior day.56 While this case does not expressly discuss the common
fact, the court recognized that the patient never went to the hospital and that the record
did not support the proposition that an actual emergency existed. Fabian, 344 A.2d at 572.
48. McClurg, supra note 1, at 182-89 (discussing common law remedies to the no duty
to treat rule); Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to
Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REV. 21, 40 (1989) (discussing the evolution of the
duty of hospitals to provide care). The Manlove case established the "reliance" exception
but was remanded to determine if the facts established that the exception should apply. Id.
49. Rothenberg, supra note 48, at 40.
[Tihe plaintiff must prove the presence of an unmistakable emergency and reli-
ance on a well-established custom. This factors, however, merely establish the
duty to treat. Plaintiff must then prove the remaining elements of a common-law
tort action: breach of duty, consequent harm and proximate cause.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. See Fabian, 344 A.2d at 572 (holding that "a private hospital is presently under no
duty to accept non-emergency patients that it does not desire"). The difficulties posed by
the Manlove decision were its failure to include a definition of an "emergency," and its lack
of guidelines for healthcare facilities on the type and extent of the duty to render emer-
gency aid to the indigent. HEALTHCARE FACILMEs LAW, supra note 8, § 6.2.1, at 426-27.
51. 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
52. Id. at 374.
53. Id. (quoting statements in record made by the admitting physician).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 376.
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law rule or carve a specific exception, it indicates that a hospital can be
held liable for injuries to a patient resulting from a failure to treat.
57
This type of judicial reasoning evolved into another exception to the
common-law rule-a wrongful discharge standard.5" In Le Juene Road
Hospital, Inc. v. Watson,59 a mother took her eleven year-old son to the
hospital at their physician's direction.' Although a medical provider ad-
ministered medication and placed the child in a hospital gown, the hospi-
tal discharged him prior to an appendectomy operation because his
mother did not have the necessary money to pay for the operation.61 The
Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the common law doctrine that the
hospital had no duty to treat, but reasoned that once treatment com-
mences, a patient should be able to rely on continued treatment.62 The
court, therefore, held that discharging a patient after the commencement
of treatment rendered the hospital liable for subsequent injuries resulting
from the failure to continue treatment.63 The court was unconcerned that
the proper paperwork had not been completed, finding that the treatment
relationship had commenced based on the actions of the medical
personnel. 64
Thus, once a professional relationship commences, a health care facility
that terminates the relationship and "abandons" the patient risks liabil-
ity.65 However, this exception to the no duty to treat rule carries its own
burdens-not unlike the reliance exception.66 In order to utilize the
abandonment doctrine, an individual must first establish the existence of
a professional relationship.67
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Le Juene Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203-04 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965) (holding that a private hospital is under no obligation to admit an emer-
gency patient; however, once treatment has commenced, a patient may not be wrongfully
discharged against his will).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 203.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 204. The court found little authority to rely on but was persuaded by a New
York Court of Appeals decision, Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 34 N.E.2d 367
(N.Y. 1941), and a Pittsburgh hospital manual dealing with proper admitting and discharg-
ing. Le Juene, 171 So. 2d at 204.
63. Le Juene, 171 So. 2d at 204.
64. Id.
65. See HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW, supra note 8, § 4.9.2, at 320-21. "Because the
healthcare facility is not liable until a professional relationship has been established, a
threshold question that may arise in abandonment cases is whether a relationship was
formed between the facility and the patient." Id. at 321.
66. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties associated
with the reliance exception).
67. See, e.g., Hill v. Ohio County, 468 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Ky. 1970) (finding that no
professional relationship was established where a pregnant woman was at the hospital for
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals demonstrated in Hill v. Ohio County6 8
that establishing the existence of a professional relationship is more diffi-
cult than simply presenting oneself for treatment at an emergency ward.69
The Hill court offered no specific standard for determining when the
existence of a professional relationship commences; however, in Hill the
standard was slightly greater than the common procedure for accessing
medical treatment through a hospital emergency ward.7" Given even this
de minimis heightened standard, the abandonment doctrine did not fully
remedy the patient dumping dilemma that resulted from private hospi-
tals' continuing ability to deny emergency medical care.7 '
These reliance and abandonment exceptions have lead to a limited
common law duty of private medical providers to treat patients.72 How-
ever, the extent of this duty, where it begins, and when it can be termi-
nated continued to be areas of litigation.73 Although the common law
has had limited success in imposing a duty to treat, its application was
haphazard and inconsistent, often resulting in no compensation in cases
where necessary treatment was denied.74
B. Statutory Solutions to the Problem of Patient Dumping
1. State Statutory Attempts
As a result of the inconsistent common law remedies, many states at-
tempted to impose a duty to treat emergency patients by enacting statutes
that require both public and private hospitals to treat individuals in emer-
gency situations.75 These statutory schemes and the degree of protection
several hours before being refused treatment by two separate physicians), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1041 (1972).
68. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 307. Generally, a person is presented at an emergency ward and requests
assistance for an emergency condition. However, in Hill a pregnant woman presented her-
self for emergency obstetrical care and was informed that since she had no attending physi-
cian on staff, and no one on duty wanted to handle her case, she could seek assistance at
hospitals in two other cities. Id. She was at the hospital for over an hour before she took a
taxi home and delivered her baby there. Id. The woman died the following day. Id. at
307-08. Ironically, Ohio County Hospital was constructed with Hill-Burton funds. Id. at
308; see infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text (discussing Hill-Burton's provisions and
problems).
71. See id.
72. HEALTHCARE FACILrrIEs LAW, supra note 8, § 6.2.2, at 428.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 45-50 (discussing the difficulties associated with the reliance ex-
ception because of the necessary proofs involved); supra notes 66-71 (discussing inconsis-
tent treatment with respect to the abandonment exception).
75. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1317, 1317.2-2a, (West Supp. 1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.1041 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-40 to -46 (Michie Supp.
19941
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vary, with some states offering comprehensive protection from a range of
possible forms of discrimination, 76 and other states limiting protection to
the indigent.'
Massachusetts and New Hampshire have drafted their statutes in the
form of a patient's bill of rights: Massachusetts provides a right to
"prompt life saving treatment in an emergency," regardless of the pa-
tient's ability to pay,78 while New Hampshire's Statute creates a right to
receive care regardless of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age,
1992); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 321-232(b) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-1391b (Supp. 1992); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.400 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2113.4 (West
1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-308.2 (Michie 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 111, § 70E (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20921 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 205.989 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439B.410 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 151:21 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-140-511 (1992). See generally Mc-
Clurg, supra note 1, at 190-97 (analyzing various state statutory attempts to handle the
patient dumping problem); Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treat-
ment & Active Labor Act: Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper Eco-
nomic Motives, 67 N.D. L. REV. 1121, 1124-26 (1992) (summarizing the various approaches
of different states).
76. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317. California provides that emer-
gency care must be rendered prior to inquiring about a patient's means of paying. Id.
§ 1317(c). The statute explicitly states: "In no event shall the provision of emergency serv-
ices and care be based upon, or affected by, the person's race, ethnicity, religion, national
origin, citizenship, age, sex, preexisting medical condition, physical or mental handicap,
insurance status, economic status, or ability to pay for medical services ... ." Id. § 1317(b).
77. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-232(b). This section provides:
No ambulance services, or any other emergency medical services available from
or under the authority of this chapter shall be denied to any person on the basis of
the ability of the person to pay therefor or because of the lack of prepaid health
care coverage or proof of such ability or coverage.
Id.
78. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E(k). The Massachusetts statute outlines var-
ious rights of every patient, including the right
to prompt life saving treatment in an emergency without discrimination on ac-
count of economic status or source of payment and without delaying treatment
for purposes of prior discussion of the source of payment unless such delay can be
imposed without material risk to his health, and this right shall also extend to
those persons not already patients or residents or a facility if said facility has a
certified emergency care unit ....
Id. In the event that treatment is refused because of economic status, the statute also
guarantees the right to
prompt and safe transfer to a facility which agrees to receive and treat such pa-
tient. Said facility refusing to treat such patient shall be responsible for: ascer-
taining that the patient may be safely transferred; contacting a facility willing to
treat such patient; arranging the transportation; accompanying the patient with
necessary and appropriate professional staff to assist in the safety and comfort of
the transfer, assure that the receiving facility assumes the necessary care
promptly, and provide pertinent medical information about the patient's condi-
tion; and maintaining records of the foregoing.
Id. § 70E(n).
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disability, marital status, sexual preference, or source of payment.79 Cali-
fornia,"0 Florida,"' Idaho,82 and Louisiana 3 all provide for broad antidis-
criminatory care, while the Hawaii statute only prohibits discrimination
when it is based on ability to pay.'
Despite the efforts of these state legislatures to address the problems of
patient dumping and discrimination in providing access to emergency
care, their attempts have not been uniformly successful.8 5 The varying
degrees of success86 of these statutes is due primarily to nonexistent or
ineffective enforcement provisions.8 7 Additionally, most statutes lack
79. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21. The statute provides that "[t]he patient shall not
be denied appropriate care on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age,
handicap, marital status, sexual preference, or source of payment." Id. § 151:21(XVI).
However, the statute does allow a hospital to transfer a patient for nonpayment of the
hospital bill. Id. § 151:21(IV).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.1041.
82. IDAHO CODE § 39-1391b. The Idaho statute does not require a hospital or its per-
sonnel to provide emergency care, however, if such care is provided, it should be in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, and emergency care should therefore not be denied "to any
person by reason of race, creed, national origin or financial ability to pay therefor." Id.
83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2113.4. The Louisiana statute mandates that hospitals
make emergency services available and "free from discrimination based on race, religion,
or national ancestry and from arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based
on age, sex, or physical condition and economic status." Id.
84. HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-232(b) (indicating that emergency services should not be
denied on the "basis of the ability of the person to pay therefor or because of the lack of
prepaid health care coverage or proof of such ability or coverage").
85. Rothenberg, supra note 48, at 54. For example, early statutory efforts to address
the problem of patient dumping in Illinois were unsuccessful due to the lack of enforce-
ment provisions in the state statute. Id. The statute did not provide for a private right of
action, nor were courts willing to imply one, thus limiting the statute's effectiveness. Id.
As a result, incidents of dumping patients from private hospitals to Cook County Hospital
in Chicago continue to be reported. Id
86. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-140-511 (1992) (providing that hospitals should
not discriminate against emergency patients due to their uninsured status or their race, sex,
religion, creed, national origin or ability to pay). Despite this statute, Dr. Kellermann,
chief of the division of Emergency Medicine at the University of Tennessee at Memphis
and director of the emergency department at the Regional Medical Center at Memphis, in
his testimony before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, stated that the Tennessee statute was "frustrated by the power of the hospital lobby,"
which "gutted the bill before it ever got out of the general assembly." Equal Access Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 118-19.
87. See HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW, supra note 8, § 6.2.2, at 428 (indicating that
few state statutes "have effective enforcement provisions"); Rothenberg, supra note 48, at
56. Professor Rothenberg noted:
[Miost state laws have limited enforcement potential. First, many laws still lack
implementing regulations. The definition of an emergency lacks clarity or is de-
fined too narrowly. Many state laws do not address the problems of transfer that
arise from a lack of appropriate services, and most laws allow transfer after "sta-
bilization," a term often used to justify economic, not medical, reasons. In addi-
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regulations clarifying their function and impose minimal or no fines for
violations.88
2. The First Federal Statute
Congress' first attempt to discourage patient dumping appeared in 1946
with the enactment of the Hill-Burton Act (Hill-Burton). s9 Hill-Burton
authorized the expenditure of federal funds for the construction and
modernization of health care facilities.' In exchange for these federal
monies, hospitals were required to provide medical treatment to individu-
als residing in the area surrounding the hospital91 and to provide some
below-cost and free medical treatment.' These services were generally
required for a twenty-year period following construction of the health
care facility.93
Hill-Burton had a limited effect and consequently was widely criti-
cized.94 This federal legislation suffered from the same maladies as many
of the state statutes.9' Hill-Burton failed to grant an express right of ac-
tion to persons denied the treatment required under the statute and
courts were loathe to uphold an implied right of action under the stat-
tion, state laws experience little meaningful enforcement. Only a few states levy
fines, usually minimal, for violations.
Id. at 56-57 (footnote omitted); see also McClurg, supra note 1, at 197. Professor McClurg
concluded: "State emergency care statutes do not provide an effective remedy for patient
dumping, most obviously because half the states have no such statutes. Moreover, all but a
few of the statutes that do exist fail to expressly provide for a private right of action." Id.
88. Rothenberg, supra note 48, at 56-57; see, e.g., MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-
308.2(b)(2) (1990) (providing for a fine not to exceed $1000 for transferring a patient in
violation of this section of the code); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.301(7) (West 1989) (indicating
that a violating hospital may be fined no more than $1000).
89. Ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 291a (1988).
91. Id. § 291c(e)(1). In addition to ensuring adequate services for all people, Congress
enacted Hill-Burton to promote research and development and to stimulate development
of new and improved medical facilities. Id.
92. Id. § 291c(e)(2).
93. Id.
94. See HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW, supra note 8, § 4.10.3, at 325-26; Stricker,
supra note 75, at 1126; 'fTeiger, supra note 2, at 1198-1201; see also Hill v. Ohio County,
468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1970) (involving patient dumping at a hospital constructed with Hill-
Burton funds), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972).
95. See HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW, supra note 8, § 4.10.3, at 325-26. "Hill-Burton
was criticized because it did not contain an express cause of action under which an individ-
ual could enforce its provisions, did not provide for punitive damages, and did not respond
to the immediate needs of the uninsured." Id.
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ute.96 Cognizant of the shortcomings of both existing state statutes and
Hill-Burton to address the patient dumping problem effectively, Congress
eventually enacted EMTALA in 1986. 7 EMTALA represented Con-
gress' attempt to address comprehensively the patient dumping
dilemma.98
II. PROVISIONS OF THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND
ACTIVE LABOR ACT
A. EMTALA Violations
Under EMTALA, any hospital receiving Medicaid or Medicare reim-
bursements from the government must provide appropriate medical
screening to any individual who comes to the hospital seeking treat-
ment.99 The hospital must either stabilize the emergency condition"° or
transfer the patient to a facility that is better equipped to care for the
particular emergency.101 A transfer, however, can occur only if the pa-
tient gives written consent after being informed of EMTALA's provi-
sions"° or a physician signs a certificate attesting that the benefits to the
patient outweigh the risks of the transfer."0 3 Another qualified medical
96. Id.; Rothenberg, supra note 48, at 59 (discussing problems associated with Hill-
Burton including the failure to provide for a private right of action, and its vague
language).
97. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
98. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27-28 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605-06.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (Supp. III 1991).
100. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A). An emergency medical condition is one which could result
in (1) placing an individual's health in jeopardy, or (2) serious complications to the pa-
tient's condition. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). For example, if a pregnant woman is having con-
tractions, an emergency medical condition exists when there is (1) insufficient time to
safely transfer the woman prior to delivery or (2) such a transfer would risk the health or
safety of the woman or her child. See id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B).
101. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B). Recently, in Burditt v. United States Department of
Health and Human Services, 934 F.2d 1362, 1372 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit indicated
that a lawful transfer of a pregnant woman in an emergency may need to include providing
a physician to accompany her on the transfer as well as adequate equipment on the ambu-
lance in case an emergency caesarean is necessary. Id. at 1373.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i). The statute mandates that an unstabilized person
can be transferred, only after "the individual (or a legally responsible person acting on the
individual's behalf) after being informed of the hospital's obligations under this section and
of the risk of transfer, in writing requests transfer to another medical facility." Id.
103. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii). This section provides in part:
[A] physician... has signed a certification that based upon the information avail-
able at the time of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from the
provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh
the increased risks to the individual and, in the case of labor, to the unborn child
from effecting the transfer ....
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professional may certify the transfer, but only after the physician makes
the necessary prior determination regarding the safety and necessity of
the transfer.' 4
B. EMTALA Enforcement
The Act imposes civil monetary penalties of up to $50,000 on a violat-
ing hospital or physician.' 5 A physician violates EMTALA by certifying
a transfer without sufficiently weighing the risks and benefits to the pa-
tient,'" or by misrepresenting a patient's condition on the certificate of
transfer.'0 7
The Act also provides for two types of private actions for damages
when the Act is violated. First, an individual directly harmed as a result
of an EMTALA violation may bring a civil suit against the hospital.
10 8
Damages in this type of suit are available according to the laws of the
state in which the violation occurred."° In addition, a hospital that re-
Id. (footnote omitted).
104. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(iii). The statute provides: "[I]f a physician is not physically
present in the emergency department at the time an individual is transferred, a qualified
medical person ... has signed a certification ... in consultation with the person, has made
the determination described in such clause, and subsequently countersigns the certification
. .. I' d.
105. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1). Hospitals with less than 100 beds are subject only to a fine of
$25,000. Id.
106. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)(i). A physician violates the Act by certifying "that the med-
ical benefits reasonably to be expected from a transfer to another facility outweigh the
risks associated with the transfer, if the physician knew or should have known that the
benefits did not outweigh the risks." Id.
107. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(ii). In addition, fines can be imposed on a physician for any
negligent violation of the Act. Id.
108. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). This section only provides for a civil suit against a violating
hospital, not a violating physician. Id.; see also Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 393 (10th
Cir. 1993) (indicating that the Act only provides a private cause of action against a hospi-
tal, not a physician). However, hospitals can be liable for the actions of their physicians
based on the law of agency. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 223 cmt. a (1958).
The restatement provides in part:
[W]hile the physician employed by a hospital to conduct operations is not, in the
normal case, a servant of the hospital, yet it may be found that the house physi-
cian or the internes, if subject to directions as to the manner in which their work
is performed, are servants of the hospital while in performance of their ordinary
duties.
Id.; see supra note 16 (discussing Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hospital Founders Ass'n,
950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991), involving hospital liability for the act of its agent physician).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991). Providing that:
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating
hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against
the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable
relief as is appropriate.
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ceives a patient who has been transferred in violation of EMTALA may
recover for any financial losses that are attributable to the transfer.1 0
Again, these losses and damages are recoverable in civil actions under the
laws of the state."' All suits under EMTALA must be brought within
the two year statute of limitations that runs from the date of the
violation."
2
III. EMTALA-PROVIDING COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION FROM
PATIENT DUMPING
A. The Erosion of the Requirement of"Indigency
1. Congressional Intent Versus the Statute's Plain Language
EMTALA's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress was con-
cerned principally with protecting indigent patients from the denial of
emergency medical treatment.'1 3 Despite this explicit concern, Congress
drafted the statute to include "any individual" rather than limiting it to
protecting only the uninsured and indigent." 4 Due to this difference be-
tween the legislative history and the statutory language, courts have re-
lied upon rules of statutory construction and interpretation to determine
the proper application of EMTALA. 15
Id.
110. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B). The statute requires:
Any medical facility that suffers a financial loss as a direct result of a participat-
ing hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action
against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for financial
loss, under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable
relief as is appropriate.
Id. This provision has not been utilized either because hospitals are unaware of their rights
or because they are loathe to turn another hospital in for a violation. See Equal Access
Hearings, supra note 1, at 119-20 (testimony of Dr. Kellermann) (indicating that since hos-
pitals in the same geographic area generally have to cooperate with one another, there is a
general reluctance to report violations).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B).
112. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C).
113. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1986) (discussing dumping of
a "patient [who] does not have medical insurance"), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579,
605; id, pt. 3, at 5 (indicating a particular concern for uninsured and indigent patients),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 726.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(b). Both of these sections refer to "any individual" and
make no indication that the Act should be limited to the uninsured. Id. Despite explicit
concern for the uninsured, the legislative history also references "any individual" when
discussing the provision of an appropriate medical screening examination. H.R. REp. No.
241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605.
115. See, e.g., Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir.
1990) (indicating that when a statute is unambiguous, the legislative history should not be
relied upon for interpretation); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 435 (D. Kan. 1990)
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When a statute is ambiguously written, its legislative history may be
relied upon to assist in its interpretation.1 6 However, if a statute is not
ambiguous, the facial reading of the statute must be followed, unless the
result would be absurd.' 7 These rules of statutory construction are the
basis for the debate concerning the interpretation of EMTALA.
Early decisions interpreting the statute follow its legislative history and
apply the statute only to the uninsured." 8 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana, for example, determined in
Evitt v. University Heights Hospital,119 that without the constraint of
pleading indigency, any person could claim failure to stabilize or im-
proper examination if they were harmed as a result of a discharge or
transfer. 120 That interpretation would render the hospital potentially lia-
ble for every diagnosis and discharge decision whether made for valid
treatment purposes or not.12' Rejecting this expansive definition, the dis-
trict court determined that the Act protected only the indigent from be-
ing dumped and thus required a showing of indigency in order to plead a
violation of the Act.122
In Stewart v. Myrick, 23 the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas followed Evitt and held that a showing of indigency is neces-
sary for a violation of the Act. 124 The Stewart court looked to EM-
TALA's legislative history to determine that indigent individuals who are
denied emergency care possess a private right of action under EMTALA
(relying on the legislative history to determine that EMTALA should only apply to the
indigent).
116. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 855 (D.C. Cir.) (reversing district
court's dismissal of complaint), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). "[W]here the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face it cannot be controverted by seeking to show
inconsistent legislative intent .... Id.
117. Id. "'[T]he "plain meaning" doctrine has always been subservient to a truly dis-
cernible legislative purpose .... ' Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d
957, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
118. See Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at 435; Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp.
495, 498 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
119. 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
120. Id. at 497-98 ("Taking the plaintiffs argument to its logical conclusion would lead
to the result that any patient dissatisfied with an emergency room diagnosis and release
could sue the hospital under the anti-dumping provision.").
121. Id. at 498. The court expiained: "This construction would, in effect, make the Hos-
pital the guarantor of the physicians' diagnosis and treatment .... Id.
122. Id. The court determined that without a showing of indigency, the statute would
merely duplicate state malpractice laws. Id. at 497-98.
123. 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990).
124. Id. at 435-36. "Indigent persons denied emergency medical care possess a private
federal cause of action under the Act." Id. at 435.
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that does not extend to the general population.125 The Stewart court con-
cluded that nonindigent patients could seek a remedy in state court for
medical malpractice, thus finding that only the uninsured possess a cause
of action under EMTALA.
126
Using the same rules of statutory construction, however, other courts-
including most courts of appeals that have heard the issue-have deter-
mined that the plain wording of EMTALA should prevail.' 27 These
courts base their judgments on the fact that the statute is not ambiguous
and that a broad interpretation of the statute does not produce an absurd
result.' 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rea-
soned in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.,129 that although
the statute's intent and plain meaning are not identical, a facial reading of
the statute was far from absurd. 3' In fact, the Cleland court found that
by allowing the statute to apply more broadly, EMTALA actually pro-
vided protection to other groups of people who may be discriminated
against when seeking access to emergency care.' 3 ' Since the plain read-
ing of the statute was neither absurd nor ambiguous, the Sixth Circuit
determined that interpreting the statute did not require the court to scru-
tinize the legislative intent.1
32
125. Id. at 435-36. The court indicated that the "case d[id] not present the type of evil
that Congress sought to eliminate in the Act." Id. at 436.
126. Id. "The case therefore falls within the ambit of state negligence law, not the fed-
eral anti-dumping law." Id.
127. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Bur-
ditt v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Svcs., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991); see
also Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990); Lee v.
Allegheny Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1991).
128. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040 ("We conclude that we are bound by statutory lan-
guage this clear, at least where, as here, it is not manifestly inconsistent with legislative
intent."); Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 ("We hold Congress to its words, that this statute applies
to any and all patients."); Lee, 778 F. Supp. at 902 ("The statute is written plainly and does
not contain any language that can reasonably be construed as limiting its application to
indigents.").
129. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990). The Clelands brought their 15-year-old son to the
emergency room of Bronson Methodist Hospital in Kalamazoo, Michigan, where he was
misdiagnosed with influenza and discharged within hours. Id. at 268. Within 24 hours the
boy died of a cardiac arrest. Id.
130. Id. at 270. "The words of the statute on basic eligibility are quite plain, and inter-
preting them as such does not lead to an absurd result." Id.
131. Id. at 272 (indicating that a physician could be prejudiced against an individual
because of their "race, sex, or ethnic group... [or] distaste for the patient's condition (e.g.,
AIDS patients)"-all noneconomic reasons that would be remedied by applying the Act as
it is written).
132. Id at 270 ("[W]e do not need to make a dramatic choice between the two canons
of construction.").
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In Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.,133 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also extended EM-
TALA protection to insured individuals. 134 The court of appeals re-
versed the district court's decision denying protection to an insured
person. 35 While the district court found that the legislative history
should prevail, the court of appeals held that it was bound by the statu-
tory language because EMTALA is clear and unambiguous. 36
Similarly, in Lee v. Allegheny Regional Hospital Corp.,'3 the district
court was unpersuaded by the reasoning of the courts in Stewart and
Evitt.131 The Lee court indicated that it was not the judiciary's responsi-
bility to rewrite statutes.139 Thus, the court agreed with the reasoning in
Cleland and held that indigency need not be pled for EMTALA to
apply."4
2. EMTALA: Providing Protection From Unforseen Causes of
Patient Dumping
While a patient's inability to pay for medical services is a primary moti-
vation behind patient dumping, a hospital may dump a patient for rea-
sons unrelated to economics,' 4 ' including prejudice by hospital personnel
against the race, sex, or ethnicity of the person seeking treatment. 42 In
addition, hospital staff have been known to discriminate against patients
133. 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Mr. Gatewood presented himself at the hospital
complaining of pain in his arm and chest. After being examined and having several tests
run, he was diagnosed with musculoskeletal pain and discharged with instruction to use a
heating pad, take TIylenol, and call his family physician in the morning. Id. at 1039. Mr.
Gatewood died of a heart attack the following morning. Id.
134. Id. at 1040.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 778 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1991). Ms. Wetzel was six months pregnant and com-
plaining of severe stomach pain when she presented herself at the hospital and was mis-
diagnosed with appendicitis. Id. at 901-02. An emergency appendectomy was performed
resulting in the premature birth of her daughter. Id. Ms. Wetzel was transferred several
days following the operation. Id. at 902. She alleged that she was not stabilized before the
transfer and thus, injuries resulted to herself and her daughter. Id.
138. Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990); Evitt v. University Heights
Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
139. Lee, 778 F. Supp. at 902.
140. Id. (indicating dissatisfaction with Stewart and Evitt, the court reiterated that it
"cannot, and will not, rewrite a statute, based solely on legislative history, in the absence of
any ambiguity").
141. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990)
(discussing possible noneconomic reasons for patient dumping, including discrimination
based on race, sex, ethnicity, or condition).
142. Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing discriminatory treatment of
African-Americans in accessing medical treatment).
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with certain diseases by refusing to treat individuals with these particular,
undesirable conditions. 43 A major concern in the patient dumping de-
bate is that the incidence of dumping patients with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) appears to be on the rise. 44
Another unforseen reason for patient dumping results from the fear of
personal liability, illustrated by Burditt v. United States Department of
Health & Human Services. 45 In Burditt the physician was unconcerned
with the patient's ability or inability to pay, but rather was deterred from
treating a pregnant woman because of his own potential financial liability
in treating her highly unstable pregnancy.'4 6 Dr. Burditt did not want to
accept the woman "from a malpractice standpoint.' 47 Under a narrow
reading of EMTALA, and based on its legislative history, protection ex-
tends only to the indigent and uninsured. 4 Therefore, a physician's fail-
ure to treat a patient based on a concern for potential liability would
obviously not be a violation of EMTALA.' a  However, under a broader
reading of EMTALA where the statute's language encompasses all indi-
viduals, the patient in Burditt falls within the purview of the statute.5
143. See Equal Access Hearings, supra note 1, at 111 (testimony of Dr. Relman). Dr.
Relman indicated that tuberculosis was the undesirable disease in his day but today the
disease that is avoided is AIDS. Id.
144. Id. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 355,
394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)), provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States .... shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. § 794(a). This statute may provide protection to persons with AIDS. See Thomas v.
Atascdero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that AIDS was
covered as a disability under the Act). However, this protection may not be sufficient, See
e.g., HEALTHCARE FACILTES LAW, supra note 8, § 4.10.4., at 326-27 (indicating that pro-
tection from discrimination due to AIDS varies from state to state). The application of the
Rehabilitation Act to persons with AIDS is, however, outside the scope of this Comment.
145. 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
146. Id. at 1367.
147. Id. Dr. Burditt made clear that "'until DeTar Hospital pays my malpractice insur-
ance, I will pick and choose those patients that I want to treat."' Id. (quoting Dr. Burditt).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605.
149. Id.
150. Regulations interpreting EMTALA are pending but have yet to be enacted. Medi-
care Program; Participation in CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA, Hospital Admissions for Vet-
erans, Discharge Rights Notice, and Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care, 53 Fed.
Reg. 22,513 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 489). The pending regulations, while not
specifically recognizing these situations, apply the Act to all individuals, not just those who
receive Medicare. Id. at 22,517.
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While antidiscrimination laws may adequately protect persons from
discriminatory dumping due to age, sex, ethnicity, or disease, such laws
still would not protect the pregnant woman in Burditt.15' Thus, EM-
TALA's protections should be applied broadly to protect the indigent
and uninsured in addition to those who are at risk of receiving discrimina-
tory treatment not otherwise protected by discrimination laws, including
discrimination due to disease or medical condition.
152
B. Patient Dumping Beyond the Emergency Room
EMTALA specifically provides that any person who presents him or
herself for treatment at an emergency room must be provided with an
appropriate medical screening exam.153 However, with respect to the
Act's stabilization requirement, no restriction limits treatment to patients
who present themselves at the emergency room.' 54 Thus, several cases
that have been brought under EMTALA allege failure to stabilize before
transfer despite lengthy prior hospitalizations.
155
151. Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1366. In Burditt, there was no discrimination based on race,
sex, ethnicity, or even unfavorable conditions. Instead, the discrimination had little to do
with Ms. Rivera and much more to do with Dr. Burditt's concern for his own financial
liability. Id. at 1367.
152. See id. (providing EMTALA protection where the patient's economic condition
was not a factor); see also Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (providing EMTALA protection regardless of the patient's financial condition);
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (indicating
that EMTALA should apply where the patient's financial condition was not an issue be-
cause patients could be dumped by a hospital for a variety of reasons).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see also Johnson v. University of
Chicago Hosp., 982 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Seventh Circuit overruled
its earlier decision, and determined that for an EMTALA violation, the patient must actu-
ally be presented at a hospital for treatment; diverting patients from one hospital to an-
other while in an ambulance is not cognizable under the Act. Id. at 232.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1). The text of the statute is plainly read to apply to "an
individual at a hospital [with] an emergency medical condition which has not been stabi-
lized." Id.
155. See, e.g., Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1991) (al-
leging a violation of EMTALA for failure to stabilize the patient prior to transferring her
following a four day hospitalization where the patient gave her consent to the transfer);
Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1132 (6th Cir. 1990) (following a
three-week stay in the hospital after a stroke, the patient alleged failure to stabilize prior to
her transfer to a long term care facility); Lee v. Allegheny Regional Hosp. Corp., 778 F.
Supp. 900, 901 (W.D. Va. 1991) (following a four-day stay in the hospital after an emer-
gency appendectomy, the patient claimed she was not stabilized when transferred); Smith
v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689, 690 (Va.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 442 (1992)
(having spent five days in the hospital, the plaintiff alleged a violation of EMTALA for
failure to stabilize her prior to transfer).
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Basing its analysis upon statutory construction, the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hospital156 determined that
while EMTALA only requires an appropriate medical screening when an
emergency patient seeks treatment, no such limitation exists under the
Act's stabilization requirements.157 Thus, the court found that the stabili-
zation requirement prior to transfer is not limited to patients in the emer-
gency ward, but applies to any patient being transferred from the medical
facility. 158 This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Act-
if EMTALA permitted a hospital to admit an emergency patient into the
hospital, thus removing that patient from the emergency room, and im-
mediately transfer that patient to another facility to avoid liability under
the Act, EMTALA would be less effective.159
EMTALA's goal is to ensure emergency care for the indigent; patient
care does not become unnecessary once a patient leaves the emergency
area or is admitted to the hospital.16° However, EMTALA was not in-
tended to require long-term hospital care for the uninsured, but only
156. 416 S.E.2d 689 (Va.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 442 (1992). A private suit under EM-
TALA may be brought in an appropriate state or federal court. Smith, however, is excep-
tional in that it was a dispute brought in state court rather than federal court. In Thornton
v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether such corresponding suits may be brought in federal court. The court
relied on a two-tiered test set forth in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vaca-
tion Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), where the Supreme Court held that such private civil actions
are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts if the suit depends on the "resolution of a
substantial question of federal law." Id. at 28. If the complainant cannot meet the "sub-
stantial question" standard, the court will consider whether Congress created a new, fed-
eral cause of action. Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1133. Fulfillment of either test is sufficient to
grant federal jurisdiction. Id. The Thornton court determined that private civil suits alleg-
ing violation of EMTALA are subject to federal jurisdiction because EMTALA creates a
federal cause of action and because these cases depend on the resolution of a question of
federal law, not state law. Id. Thus, a private suit for an EMTALA violation can be
brought in an appropriate state or federal court. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27-28 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.CC.A.N. 579, 606.
157. Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 692.
158. Id.
159. See id.; see also Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1135 (stating that "emergency care does not
always stop when a patient is wheeled from the emergency room into the main hospital").
160. Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 692.
If an individual "comes to the emergency department," the hospital must provide
an appropriate medical screening examination. If an individual "comes to a hos-
pital" and the hospital determines that an emergency medical condition or active
labor exists, the hospital must stabilize the condition or transfer the person. If a
"patient at a hospital" has an emergency condition or is in active labor, the hospi-
tal may transfer that patient only under certain conditions.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
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emergency treatment for those in need.' 6' While the availability of EM-
TALA protection to all persons beyond the confines of the emergency
room provides comprehensive protection from patient dumping, it also
places hospitals and physicians at risk for EMTALA violations whenever
a decision to discharge or transfer is made, since any patient transferred
in an unstable condition has a potential cause of action.162
IV. THE BENEFICIAL EFFECT OF COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-PATIENT
DUMPING LEGISLATION
A. EMTALA: Prohibiting Failure to Treat
Without the necessity of pleading indigency, many suits brought under
EMTALA have the same characteristics as state malpractice or wrongful
death cases, or contain these types of state law claims as well.163 One suit
brought under EMTALA involved a transfer where the patient gave her
161. Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1135 (Jones, J., concurring) ("The Act was designed to pre-
vent hospitals from either turning down or 'dumping' indigent patients. It was not a mea-
sure to force hospihals to provide long-term care for uninsured patients.").
162. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmen-
tal Relations of the House Committee on Government Operations in 1987, Dr. Relman,
then head of the New England Journal of Medicine, proposed that no emergency patient
should be transferred. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 1, at 106 (testimony of Dr.
Reiman). Dr. Kellermann, Chief of the division of Emergency Medicine at the University
of Tennessee at Memphis, and Director of Emergency Services at the Regional Medical
Center at Memphis, agreed with Dr. Relman but also suggested that a national standard of
care might be sufficient in defining "stabilization." Id. at 120 (testimony of Dr. Kel-
lermann). Dr. Kellermann similarly suggested that the doctrine of informed consent may
be of assistance. Id. He suggested that the law could be strengthened by prohibiting pa-
tient transfers without informed consent to the transfer. Id.
163. See, e.g., Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir. 1992) (involving a
patient who remained in the hospital for 26 days after an accident and based his claim on a
violation of EMTALA for failure to perform an appropriate medical screening exam which
would have diagnosed a serious hip injury); Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders
Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1991) (involving a misdiagnosed heart attack where the
patient was examined in the emergency room, subsequently sent home and instructed to
contact her family physician if the pain persisted-the patient died within 24 hours); Gate-
wood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (following an
emergency room examination and misdiagnosis of heart condition as musculo-skeletal
pain, the hospital discharged the patient with treatment instructions, he died the next
morning); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990)
(following an examination and misdiagnosis as having influenza, the patient was discharged
and died within 24 hours). Many of these cases involved traditional state claims as well.
See, e.g., Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 678 (alleging both a violation of EMTALA and a state
claim for wrongful death); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1038 (involving allegations of malprac-
tice and violations of EMTALA for failure to stabilize prior to discharge); see also Collins,
963 F.2d at 304 n.2 (following an unsuccessful state malpractice suit, the plaintiff brought a
federal EMTALA action).
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consent to be transferred to another hospital for treatment purposes.164
Another case involved the discharge of a patient in need of long-term
care following a long hospital stay after suffering from a stroke.165 The
drafters of the statute did not intend EMTALA to extend to the point of
infringing on legitimate treatment decisions concerning discharge or
transfer. 166 Rather than involving valid violations of EMTALA, some of
these cases simply involved creative pleading of malpractice claims in or-
der to allege an EMTALA violation as well.' 67 Not every discharge,
transfer, or misdiagnosis is actionable under EMTALA: Congress in-
tended to create a new federal cause of action for failure to treat a patient
but did not intend to duplicate existing state negligence and malpractice
laws.' 68 While many actions brought under EMTALA may also involve
state claims, the causes of action are different.
169
For example, while traditional state malpractice cases apply a negli-
gence standard, 70 a strict liability standard is generally applied under
EMTALA.171 In an early suit for violation of the statute, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 172 indicated that
164. Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) (alleging both
state claims and an EMTALA violation for transferring a patient to another facility for a
medical procedure).
165. Thornton, 895 F.2d 1131 at 1132.
166. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605. The legislative history states that "[t]he Committee is greatly con-
cerned about the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing
to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient does not have medical
insurance." Id. This history makes it clear that the statute was drafted to address the
refusal of hospital to treat certain emergency patients. Id.
167. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 (indicating that the plaintiffs had creatively pled their
claim to include a violation of EMTALA).
168. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(stating that EMTALA was not enacted "to duplicate preexisting legal protections, but
rather to create a new cause of action, generally unavailable under state tort law, for what
amounts to failure to treat"); see also Thornton, 895 F.2d at 1133 ("A cause of action under
the Act is not analogous to a state medical malpractice claim because it creates liability for
a refusal to treat, which state malpractice law does not."); H.R. Rep. No. 241, 99th Cong.,
2d. Sess., pt. 3, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 727 (describing a "new
federal cause of action").
169. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
170. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65
(5th ed. 1984) (articulating the necessary elements of a negligence cause of action: duty,
breach, causation, and damages).
171. See Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 681 (10th
Cir. 1991) (finding that the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), (c) (1988 & Supp. III
1991) impose a strict liability standard for EMTALA violations); Stevison v. Enid Health
Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990); Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical
Hosp., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (indicating that EMTALA "was based
on a strict liability standard").
172. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 853.
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strict liability applies to private actions under the statute. 173 That is, once
a violation has been established, the defendant is liable for the resulting
damages. 74 In Stevison v. Enid Health Systems, Inc. ,'7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion, find-
ing that section 1395dd(a) contains mandatory language1 76 that creates a
strict liability standard.
1 77
EMTALA is distinguishable from state malpractice claims in another
respect-it preempts all state and local laws that conflict with its require-
ments. 78 In Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hospital, Inc. ,17
Indiana's procedural limitations with regard to malpractice claims' 8 °
were considered inapplicable with respect to private actions under
173. Id. at 854-55 (holding that § 1395dd, which is based on a strict liability standard,
"creates . . . a private cause of action against a hospital that improperly transfers a
patient").
174. KEETON, supra note 170, at 534.
175. 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that EMTALA contains "mandatory
language" thus imposing a strict liability standard).
176. Id. "Under the statute, the hospital must provide a medical screening if a request
is made." Id.
177. Id. ("We construe this statute as imposing a strict liability standard subject to those
defenses available in the act."). The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed Stevison in Abercrombie v.
Osteopathic Hospital Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991), relying on the literal
language of the Act as the basis for its decision that strict liability was the appropriate
standard. Id. at 681 ("Congress could have added the word 'negligently' in its civil enforce-
ment provision, but it chose not to. In such circumstance, the courts should not rewrite the
civil enforcement provision."). The Abercrombie court found it significant that the term
"negligently," 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1991), is used with respect to a physi-
cian's violation of the Act but the term is absent from the section regarding civil enforce-
ment. Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 681; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2). The court further
noted that neither the medical screening requirement, nor the requirement of only trans-
ferring stable patients, incorporates a negligence standard. Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 681;
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), (c). The Abercrombie court concluded that this construc-
tion supported a strict liability standard under EMTALA. Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 681.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f). "The provisions of this section do not preempt any State or
local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a
requirement of this section." Id.
179. 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
180. For example, the court explained that a complaint presented to a medical review
panel is a state procedure. Id. at 854. The court indicated that is was unaware of a single
federal statute that "incorporated state procedural limitations on a federal cause of action
brought in a federal court." Id.; cf Wilson v. Atlanticare Medical Ctr., 868 F.2d 34, 35 (1st
Cir. 1989) ("Doctors and hospitals, and, ultimately, their other patients, need screening
protection against frivolous claims as much under the federal statute as they do for other
malpractice charges."). The Wilson court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to an-
swer a motion referring the matter to the state court tribunal; a state procedure that the
plaintiff argued was incompatible with EMTALA. Id. The court indicated that because
the plaintiff failed to answer this motion, the issue was moot, thus inferring the court's
approval of the application of state procedures to a federal EMTALA action. Id.
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EMTALA. 181 Such restrictions were found to conflict with the statute's
preemption clause because congressional intent to incorporate state pro-
cedures is not evidenced whatsoever and because the state statute was
based on a negligence standard which directly conflicts with the strict lia-
bility standard of EMTALA. l8 2 However, the Reid court found that the
state cap on medical malpractice damages applied in the private EM-
TALA action because EMTALA provides for a plaintiff to obtain the
damages available "for personal injury under the law of a state.1 83 The
court found that the state cap on damages did not violate the preemption
clause because it did not conflict with the statute, and was in fact consis-
tent with it.18
In Power v. Arlington Hospital,'85 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia determined that the federal statute's pur-
pose was at odds with the purpose of the state statute that established
procedural requirements and a damages cap for medical malpractice ac-
tions.' 86 The Virginia statute was concerned with ensuring that medical
malpractice insurance was available to and affordable for health care
providers-the Powers court found this purpose to be so different from
the purpose of the federal statutory scheme, that it held that the state
statutory requirements were preempted by the federal law.' 87 The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has also held that state procedures for bringing a
malpractice claim did not apply to an EMTALA action because they con-
flict with the Act's statute of limitations and are therefore preempted by
the federal statute. 188
B. Limiting State Malpractice Claims in Federal Courts
One commentator has suggested that EMTALA should be interpreted
according to its legislative history, thus requiring a showing of indi-
181. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 854-55.
182. Id. at 855. The preemption clause is located at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f), and states
that the statute incorporates state law to the extent that it does not conflict with the federal
statute.
183. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855
184. Id. "[Tihe amount of damages that would be 'available' for a personal injury claim
against a healthcare provider would be only those damages under that medical malpractice
statute itself." Id. (emphasis in original).
185. 800 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992).
186. Id. at 1389. Discussing the difference between the purpose of EMTALA and Vir-
ginia's medical malpractice cap, the court found that "[t]his sharp difference in statutory
purposes militates firmly against engrafting Virginia's malpractice damages cap onto EM-
TALA." Id.
187. Id. at 1392.
188. Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689, 695 (Va.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 442 (1992).
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gency.' 8 9 This solution would avoid the present situation in which federal
judicial resources are wasted adjudicating claims that are suited better for
state courts.19° In fact, several federal district courts support this
conclusion.19'
In Stewart v. Myrick,"9 the plaintiff did not allege indigency; neverthe-
less, he claimed that EMTALA was violated.193 The patient sought medi-
cal assistance for chest pain and shortness of breath.194 TWo days later,
the patient returned to the hospital for tests, but was not admitted despite
claims that he needed emergency treatment.195 The patient suffered a
heart attack one week later and died shortly after arriving at the hospi-
tal.1 96 The district court determined that these facts gave rise to a state
action for medical malpractice, not a federal cause of action for patient
dumping,"9 and indicated that indigency was an essential element for a
violation of EMTALA.198
The Stewart case represents a traditional state malpractice claim, not an
action for the type of patient dumping Congress sought to curb in enact-
ing EMTALA.' 99 Similarly, in Evitt v. University Heights Hospital,2" the
district court held that pleading indigency was necessary to avoid a situa-
tion where any patient who is dissatisfied with an emergency room diag-
nosis and is subsequently released can sue under the patient dumping
statute.20'
C. Repercussions of Limiting EMTALA Based on Indigency
Limiting EMTALA to indigent patients may prevent situations where
patients plead an EMTALA violation when in fact their claim is better
189. Stricker, supra note 75, at 1158 (indicating that confusion and inconsistency would
be reduced if indigency were required and stating that the state malpractice law is an ap-
propriate remedy for persons who cannot sustain a showing of indigency).
190. Id. at 1122, 1158.
191. See Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990); Evitt v. University
Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495, 498 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
192. 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990).




197. Id. at 436. "This case therefore falls within the ambit of state negligence law, not
the federal anti-dumping law." Id.
198. Id. at 435 ("Indigent persons denied emergency medical care possess a private
federal cause of action under the Act.").
199. Id. at 436.
200. 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
201. Id. at 497-98.
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recognized under a state negligence claim.2' A serious repercussion of
this approach, however, would be the lack of protection for those who are
discriminated against for noneconomic reasons. 20 3 A supporter of the
narrow interpretation for EMTALA indicates that discrimination by a
hospital based on race, sex, or disease is specifically protected against by
other federal statutes.2°4 Congressman Pete Stark, a major proponent of
EMTALA, indicated in his statement before the House Subcommittee of
the Committee on Government Operations that there are three ways in
which a patient is protected from patient dumping: Hill-Burton, civil
rights law, and EMTALA. 20 5 Despite the availability of other protec-
tions, Congressman Stark nevertheless regarded EMTALA as an impor-
tant and necessary piece of legislation.2°
If the protections of EMTALA were limited only to the indigent, the
overall effectiveness of the statute would be abrogated. The purpose of
EMTALA is to protect against patient dumping.2' Congress intended to
protect the indigent; however, this legislation goes much further by creat-
ing a comprehensive statute, providing protection from discrimination in
access to emergency care.208 To limit EMTALA to the uninsured would
reduce protections for many in need.
202. Stricker, supra note 75, at 1158 (claiming state malpractice to be a more efficient
forum for deciding claims that do not involve discrimination).
203. Supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text (discussing various reasons other than
economic status for patient dumping).
204. See generally Stricker, supra note 75, at 1129. Arguably, by applying EMTALA
only to the uninsured, congressional intent will be maintained and the statute will be most
efficiently applied. Id. at 1158. Patients discriminated against for other reasons are pro-
tected under federal civil rights laws. Id. at 1145.
205. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (testimony of Representative Pete
Stark).
206. Id. Congressman Stark was particularly concerned with the potential for persons
with AIDS being dumped by hospitals. Id.; see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text
(discussing the difficulties that AIDS patients encounter in the health system).
207. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 579,605. "The committee is most concerned that medically unstable patients
are not being treated appropriately." Id.
208. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990)
(outlining a multiplicity of reasons that persons could be discriminated against in seeking
emergency treatment and finding that the application of EMTALA in these situations is
not wholly inconsistent with congressional intent).
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V. MEANS OF STRENGTHENING EMTALA
A. Defining Stabilized and Appropriate Medical Screening
1. Stabilized
With the extensions of EMTALA beyond the confines of the emer-
gency room,2°9 an increasing need exists to provide hospitals with con-
crete definitions, thus enabling them to comply adequately with
EMTALA. For example, compliance with the Act would be more man-
ageable if the term "stabilized '210 were more clearly defined.211
The court in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.212 indicated
that unless the emergency treatment given to stabilize a patient was
somehow different from the treatment given to a paying patient, no viola-
tion of EMTALA could be established.213 The Cleland court insisted that
a showing of discrimination was necessary.214 Under the court's reading
of the statute, a patient should be considered "'stabilized"' if the treat-
ment was medically "reasonable" so that "no material deterioration of
209. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1991). The Act defines "'stabilized"' as
"no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability,
to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility, or, with respect
to an emergency medical condition... [of a pregnant woman], that the woman has deliv-
ered (including the placenta)." Id. Similarly, the statute defines "'to stabilize"' as requir-
ing the provision of
such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure, within
reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is
likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility,
or, with respect to an emergency medical condition... [of a pregnant woman], to
deliver (including the placenta).
Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
211. Equal Access Hearings, supra note 1, at 104 (testimony of Dr. Relman); id. at 119
(testimony of Dr. Kellermann). Dr. Relman stated that "'stabilization' is hard to define
and unreliable. The definition given in subsection (e)(4)(B) is deceptively oversimplified
and potentially risky to the patient." Id. at 106. Dr. Kellermann noted that "'stabilization'
... is a loophole big enough to drive a tank through." Id. at 120. Dr. Kellermann, chief of
the division of Emergency Medicine at the University of Tennessee at Memphis and direc-
tor of the emergency department of the Regional Medical Center at Memphis, suggests
that adopting a national standard of care for "stabilization" would be helpful. Id.
212. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 129-32 (discussing the Cleland
decision).
213. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271. Applying this standard to the facts before it, the court
stated:
There is not the slightest indication that this outcome would have been any differ-
ent for a patient of any other characteristics. Had his sex, race, national origin,
financial condition, politics, social status, etc., been anything whatsoever, as far as
can be gleaned from the complaint, the outcome would have been the same.
Id. Thus, the complaint failed to allege a violation of EMTALA. Id.
214. Id. "In the hospital's opinion, the patient was stable, and they would have be-
lieved that a patient with any differing characteristics would have been stable." Id.
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215the condition" would likely occur, and that patient received the samestabilizing treatment that a paying patient would have received.216
2. Appropriate Medical Screening Examination
Not every medical misdiagnosis constitutes an inappropriate screening
triggering an EMTALA violation. 217 Therefore, the standards thus far
enunciated with respect to the requirement of an appropriate medical
screening2 18 are either a medical screening that a paying patient would
have received 219 or a screening that complies with the medical standards
of the hospital.22 The subtle difference between these two approaches is
significant only in theory because in practice the standards should be the
same.
In Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.,221 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined whether a medical
screening was appropriate based on the motives of the hospital.222 More
specifically, the court questioned whether the hospital was motivated by
the economics of the patient when it conducted a screening exam.223 In
Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp. ,224 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made no such distinction for
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1991).
216. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
217. See supra note 168 (citing cases indicating that EMTALA was a new federal cause
of action and not intended to duplicate existing state causes of action).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). The only restriction in the Act regarding "appropriate
medical screening examination" is that it be "within the capability of the hospital's emer-
gency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency depart-
ment, to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition... exists." Id.; cf. id.
§ 1395dd(e) (defining "emergency medical condition," "participating hospital," "to stabi-
lize," "stabilized," "transfer," and "hospital," but not providing a definition for "appropri-
ate medical screening examination").
219. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272. The court stated its belief
that the terms of the statute, specifically referring to a medical screening exam by
a hospital "within its capabilities" precludes resort to a malpractice or other ob-
jective standard of care as the meaning of the term "appropriate." Instead, "ap-
propriate" must more correctly be interpreted to refer to the motives with which
the hospital acts. If it acts in the same manner as it would have for the usual
paying patient, then the screening provided is "appropriate" within the meaning
of the statute.
Id.
220. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
"In our view, then, a hospital fulfills the 'appropriate medical screening' requirement when
it conforms in its treatment of a particular patient to its standard screening procedures."
Id.
221. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
222. Id at 272.
223. Id.
224. 933 F.2d 1037 (1991).
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motives and established the criterion for an appropriate screening as
standard hospital procedures.225 Since the practical differences between
these two approaches are insignificant, they should provide the touch-
stone for the determination of an appropriate medical screening. Where
a patient receives a screening that complies to standard hospital proce-
dures,226 or is compatible to one given a nonindigent client,227 no viola-
tion of the medical screening provision of EMTALA should exist.
B. The Need To Report EMTALA Violations
Despite the creation of a broad antidumping statute, the effectiveness
of EMTALA has been recently questioned.2' A report published by
Public Citizen Health Research Group charges that EMTALA is not be-
ing enforced effectively.229 Instead of punishing violations by imposing
sanctions under the statute, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), whose job it is to enforce the statute, usually
forces violators only to change rules and training practices.
230
EMTALA does not require that violations of the Act be reported,231
but instead, provides that hospitals receiving transfers in violation of the
Act are entitled to bring a private action against the transferring hospi-
tal.23 2 If hospitals were required to report violations, the actual number
of incidents of patient dumping would be reported more realistically.233
In addition, more reported cases would provide guidance for hospitals
and physicians to be better equipped to avoid future violations of
EMTALA. 4
225. Id. at 1041.
226. Id.
227. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272.
228. Between 1986 and 1992, only 268 hospitals were cited for 302 violations of patient
dumping. Spenser Rich, HHS Called Lax on Halting Patient "Dumping", WASH. POST,
May 20, 1993, at A3.
229. Lynn Wagner, Illegal Transfers Continue-Report, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May
24, 1993, at 8. "Public citizen charged HHS with being lax in enforcing the anti-dumping
law because only 17 hospitals and three physicians were fined from 1986 to 1992." Id.
230. Rich, supra note 228, at A3.
231. Id. "Final regulations spelling out all the terms for complying with the law have
never been published. In addition, HHS has not required institutions to whom a patient
was sent improperly by the 'dumping' hospital to report that fact to HHS." Id.; cf. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 395.1041(4) (West 1993) (requiring hospitals to maintain records of all trans-
fers for' five years and to report all violations).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see supra note 107 (quoting
statutory language); see supra note 110 (discussing why hospitals do not voluntarily assert
their rights under EMTALA when a transfer is received in violation of the Act).
233. Rich, supra note 228, at A3.
234. New Newsletter to Focus on Patient Transfer Law, MASS. LAW. WrKLy., May 31,
1993, at 27. A newsletter, entitled "Federal Patient ransfer Law ALERT," began in June,
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C. A Showing of Discrimination Must Be Required
EMTALA should not create a cause of action only for the uninsured,
but should be available whenever an individual is denied emergency care
due to discrimination. In Cleland, the Sixth Circuit indicated that without
a showing of some type of discrimination, no violation of EMTALA ex-
isted." 5 The requirement that discrimination be pleaded for a cognizable
violation of EMTALA would strengthen the Act by giving guidance to
hospitals. As the Act presently is interpreted, hospitals must be wary of
potential EMTALA violations whenever a patient is transferred or dis-
charged, even if the patient provided informed consent to such action.236
Were a showing of discrimination of some type necessary, hospitals would
be protected better where transfers or discharges were made for valid
treatment reasons. Furthermore, the requirement that there be a show-
ing of discrimination for a violation would conserve federal judicial re-
sources and would not foreclose those parties with potential malpractice
claims from bringing these actions in an appropriate state court. Many of
the cases brought under EMTALA, as it is now drafted and broadly inter-
preted, would not be cognizable if a showing of discrimination, whether
based on race, sex, ethnicity, religion, disease, or even potentially danger-
ous condition, were required for a violation.
237
1993, to inform hospitals and physicians about the law of patient dumping, federal and
state statutes on the subject, and alert readers to recent regulations. Id.
235. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990).
236. See, e.g., Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991). In that
case, the plaintiff alleged a violation of EMTALA when she had consented to the transfer
to another facility. Id. Although the circuit court affirmed the district court's finding of no
EMTALA violation, id. at 415, if she had been required to include a showing of discrimina-
tion, the case would have been dismissed at the eraly stages, since the record did not indi-
cate any type of discrimination. Rather, it illustrated that the decisions regarding the
patient's care were made for treatment purposes. Id. at 413-14.
237. See, e.g., Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1132 (6th Cir. 1990).
In Thornton, the plaintiff alleged an EMTALA violation on the ground that the hospital
failed to stabilize her prior to transferring her home for long term care. Id. The Southwest
Detroit Hospital had attempted to secure a bed for Ms. Thornton in the Detroit Rehabili-
tative Institute, a long-term care facility. Since this facility would not accept her due to her
lack of medical insurance, she was transferred home. Id. She eventually gained accept-
ance to the Detroit Rehabilitative Institute and subsequently brought suit against the
Southwest Detroit Hospital for transferring her home in an unstabilized condition.
Clearly, this type of transfer was outside the scope of EMTALA's legislative intent. Id at
1134 (quoting the Act's legislative history). With the requirement of pleading discrimina-
tion, this suit would have been dismissed at the early stages, or not brought at all, thus
conserving judicial resources.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The drafters of EMTALA envisioned a federal statute that would alle-
viate the problem of patient dumping and open the door to unfettered
emergency care for those who need it. EMTALA currently provides for
the comprehensive protection that Congress sought. The courts have ex-
tended EMTALA's reach beyond the confines of the emergency room,
however, and recognized private rights of action under the statute for any
person who alleges an injury, rather than just the uninsured. This appli-
cation of EMTALA to situations possibly unforeseen by the drafters of-
fers broad protection for patients, but places hospitals and physicians at
constant risk of violating EMTALA. To abrogate this risk, courts should
instead require some showing of discrimination as a prerequisite for find-
ing an EMTALA violation, however, that discrimination should be
broader than just discrimination based upon inability to pay. EMTALA
should protect against general discrimination in access to emergency care.
Furthermore, physicians and hospitals should not face liability under
EMTALA when they comply with the standard hospital procedures in
providing an appropriate medical screening exam and transferring a pa-
tient. As long as every patient receives standard care that would be given
to a paying patient, no violation of the Act should be found. Despite the
creation of this far reaching statute, violations rarely are reported. Until
facilities receiving illegal transfers report these incidents, the practice of
patient dumping will not subside.
Mary Jean Fell
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